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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
11786 
JESSE JUNIOR GILPIN, 
Def endant-AppeUant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Jesse Junior Gilpin, is appealing from 
a conviction of robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-01-1 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant, Jesse Junior Gilpin, was found guilty 
by a .i ury of the crime of robbery on March 4, 1969, and 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indetermi-
nate term as prescribed by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision 
of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of 
2 
Utah, and hold that no erron; were committed by th t · e rial 
court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the facts as set out by appeJ. 
lant but wishes to insert the following. 
The appellant relied on the defense of alibi. He called 
his aunt (T. 140), his cousins (T. 142, 148, 157), his close 
friend (T. 150) and himself (T. 162) to testify that he 
was at his aunt'.s home on September 27, 1968, between 
7 :00 and 10 :00 p.m. Three 'Of the witnesses who testified 
were not present at the home located at 263 West First 
North and were not in faot alibi witnesses. They added 
nothing to the alibi defense (T. 146, 149, 152). 
Evidence concerning a fight which had occurred on 
the night of the robbery was introduced and allowed for 
the purpose of showing only that a fight diid in fact take 
place in Midvale after the robbery (T. 155). In fact, the 
evidence was to estabiish merely that the defendant was in 
Midvale (T. 156). The prosecution did not object to that 
point (T. 150), but did in fact object to any endless detail 
about the fight (T. 155). This objection was sustained (T. 
156) . The defense counsel explained that he did not wish 
to go into detail about the fight (T. 155). 
The defendant testified that he was in Midvale on the 
night of the robbery ( T. 166) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENY-
ING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUP-
3 
PRESS THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT; THE CONFRONTATIONS 
BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND STATE'S 
WITNESSES DID NOT VIOLATE THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT NOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
OF THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS. 
The appellant states in his argument that his Fiflth 
Amendment right<; were violated. He has not, however, 
developed this argument in his brief. It deserves emphasis 
that this case presents no question of the admissibmty in 
evidence of anything Gilpin said or did whch implicates his 
privilege. A Fifth Amendment violation is therefore not rin 
question. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). 
There are several approaches available to the Court, 
and each one supports the position that the trial court did 
not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the in-
court identification. 
POINT IA. 
LOOKING AT THE TOTALITY OF THE CIR-
C UM ST AN C ES SURROUNDING THE IN-
COURT IDENTIFICATIONS AND THE PRE-
TRIAL VIEWINGS, IT IS CLEAR THAT AP-
PELLANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW BY THE ADMISSION OF THE IN-
COURT IDENTIFICATIONS. 
Since both confrontations took place before custody 
and before an information was filed, Wade, supra, and 
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Gilbert V. Californm. 388 U. S. 263 (1967), do not apply. 
This same approach was follo\Yecl by the Arizona Supreme 
Court in State V. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P. 2d 964 
(1969) : 
"Wade and Gilbert are inapplicable in this case 
as they relate only to poot-information situations. 
( Cita;tion omitted.) In the instant case no informa-
tion has been filed and counsel had not yet been 
appointed." Id. at 487, 455 P. 2d at 965. 
The situation is the same in this case. Since Wade and 
Gilbert do not apply, our determination of the issue is con-
troHed by Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 ( 1967). The pre-
cise issue to be decided is whether, looking at the totality 
of the circumstances ·Surrounding the in-court identifica-
tion and pre-trfal confrontations, the appellant was denied 
due process of law by admission of the State's witnesses' 
identification at the trial. The trial court ruled in a motion 
to suppress that the pre-tri.al confrontations did not violate 
appellant's rights. This determination wa.s correct and the 
judge did not err in so ruling. 
Both Mrs. Mitchell and Miss Hom were afforded ample 
opportunity for sustained observation of the appellant at 
the time of the robbery. The appellant did not wear a mask 
or disguise, or otherwise attempt to conceal his identity 
from the victims. Mrs. Mitchell served coffee to the appel-
lant (T. 90) and observed him while he sat in a booth (T. 
90) . She observed him as he came around the cash register 
and took out the money (T. 91). She watched him back out 
the door and run towards the Centre Theater (T. 91-92) · 
There is nothing to suggest that the lighting was bad or 
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that the angle at which Mrs. Mitchell viewed the appeHant 
subjected him to any distortions. 
Miss Hom also saw the appellant cleal'ly. She was at 
the ca.sh register ·when appellant took out the money (T. 
113). Both witnesses positively identified the appellant as 
one of the men which robbed the Pancake House. This 
identification, when looked at in light of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding it, did not violate due process 
of law. 
The appellant challenges two separate confrontations, 
i.e., the confrontation between Mrs. Mitchell and appellant 
in front of Dee's Drive-In on 33rd South and Highland 
D1·ive, and the confrontation between Miss Hom and ap-
pellant in the courtroom of the Honorable Leonard W. 
Elton, Judge, Third Di.strict Court. The respondent will 
discuss these confrontations separately. 
Mrs. ·Mitchell first saw the appellant on the night of 
the robbery. She testified that she saw him clearly (T. 
90-91}. About three weeks later she again saw the appel-
lant in front of Dee's Drive-In on Highland Drive and 33rd 
South. She was riding with a deputy sheriff whom she ha;d 
e;;,:lled because she feared that her husband would harm her 
(T. 92). The evidence is clear that she saw appellant first 
and indicated to the deputy that he looked like one of the 
men who had robbed her (T. 92, 107). The officer made 
no suggestions to her before this time. There is nothing 
whatsoever which indicates that the deputy and Mrs. 
Mitchell went by Dee's ·with the pre-conceived idea of see-
ing one of the robbers. Mrs. Mitchell made the initial 
tification completely on her own. 'rhe deputy suggested 
nothing to her. 
After Mrs. Mi:tchell .spotted the appeHan:t, the deputy 
turned around to let her have a better look ( T. 92). He 
caHed appellant to the car and talked with him throug'h the 
front window. Mrs. Mitchell then identified the 
appellant as one of the men who had robbed the Pancake 
House on September 27, 1968 (T. 92). This oonfroilltation 
occurred on October 22, 1968. To suggest that before ap-
pellant could be identified in these circumsltances counsel 
must be provided, is to stretch Wade and Gilbert totally 
out of proportion siince they deailt only wi.th post--informa-
tion 'lineups, where the police influence was highly sug-
gestive. Neither fact was present in this first confronta-
tion situation. The appellant's argument concerning this 
first confronrtJartion is wilthout merit and suggests tha:t be-
fore a defendant can be identified in court, counsel should 
have been wiith him throughout the entire robbery and at 
any time thereafter, just in case one of the victims happens 
to see him in the street. 
Concerning the confrontation between Miss Hom and 
the appellant, it is dear that no identification was made at 
that time (T. 116). Miss Hom had gone to the police sta-
tion to view a lineup and attempt to idenltify the taJller 
robber. She was unable to make 1an identification (T. 115). 
At the request of Detective Ledford, she went upstairs to 
a courtroom to see if "anyone looked familiar" (T. 115) · 
She was there for two minutes and was unable to identify 
the defendant 1who was in foot present (T. 116). Since no 
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identification was made, no prejudice resuited to the ap-
pellant and this viewing did not violate due process of law. 
Uni:ted States V. Scully, 415 F. 2d 680 (2d Oir. 1969), held 
that where no posiitive identification was made of the de-
fendant at the confrontation, then the in-court identifica-
tion need not be excluded. Id. at 684. 
Miss Hom testiffod that she did not make a positive 
identification of the appellant untH he appeared at the 
preliminary hearing (T. 117). In United States v. Black, 
412 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir. 1969), the court, relying on Stovall, 
held: 
"In order Ito :taint an identification rtt must ap-
pear that .the viewing wa.s unnecessarily suggesibive 
and conducive to irreparable mistaken idenrtific.a-
tion." Id. at 690. 
The identification in Black occurred at a preliminary 
hearing where, like in appellant's situation, counsel was 
present but had no notice that his cUent was being identli-
fied. The viewing was in a state courtroom in which a 
judge was presiddng. The defendant and his brother were 
present with :their counsel. The witnesses were instructed 
only to abserve the two defendants to determine whether 
either of them looked like any of the photographs which 
1Jhey had seen. Black was not pointed ou:t by :thJe F. B. I. 
agents. Id. at 690. In the instant case, Miss Hom was 
told to see if anyone looked familiar. She was not told that 
Gilpin was the suspect. This procedure is not unnecessarily 
suggestive, as the court in Black so held. This reasoning is 
applicable fo both the viewing in Judge Elton's Court and 
the viewing at the preliminary hearing. In either situation, 
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the appellant's rights were not violated and the procedure 
rwas not suggestive. 
In Unit('d Staf('s v. Lipo1citz, 401 F. 2d 591 (3d Cir. 
1968), the "·itnesses of a bank robbery were requested to 
sit in a comtroom during the arraignment of a suspect, 
" ... to determine if they could recognize any of the men 
in the courfroom." Id. at 591. It was held that the pro-
cedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. 
In United States v. Qual'les, 387 F. 2d 551 (4th Cir. 
1967), the Court said: 
"Martin had no right that he not be viewed. 
United States V. Wade, 388 U. S. at 221. A lineup 
is not the only means of identifying a suspect; an 
individual not in custody, as Martin, 'may be placed 
under surveilance - he may be viewed on the 
streets, entering or leaving his home or place of 
bus1iness, at places of amusement, or at any other 
place where he is not entitled to privacy.' " Id. at 
556. 
The appellant had no right that he not be viewed. In either 
confrontation by Mrs. Mitchell or by Miss Hom, the appel-
lant was viewed prior to information and prior to custody 
f 01' the crime charged. The totality of the circumstances 
show beyond a doubt that due process was not violated. 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377 ( 1968). The view-
ings were not so unnecessarily suggestive as to lead to an 
irreparable mistaken identification. 
POINT IB. 
THE APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED 
BECAL'SE THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
HAD AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE. 
Even if TV ade and Gilbe1 t ai·e applicable to this case, 
the Comt can affirm the trial comt's decision on the basis 
that the in-comt ictentification had an independent source. 
United States V. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 2·12 ( 1967). 
In Stntc v. V(lsquez, 22 Utah 2d 277, 451 P. 2d 786 
(1969), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"The record before this court does permit an 
independent judgment and discloses that Coxey's in-
court identification had an independent source, 
namely, Coxey"s description of the automobile and 
its occupants and his identification of Vasquez and 
the other four defendants shortly after the occur-
rence and during the course of their apprehension." 
Id. at 279, 451 P. 2d at 787-788. 
Even though the precise facts are different, the tiest to be 
<epplied is the same, i.e., does the record permit an inde-
pendent juctgment and disclose that Mrs. Mitchell's and 
lVIiss Hom's in-court identifications had an independent 
source? Respondent submits that it does. 
Both witnesses made a positive identification of the 
appellant in comt (T. 90; 113). On crnss-examination they 
we1·e questioned thoroughly about the robbery, their state-
ments to the deputy sheriff and Detective Ledord, and their 
identifications (T. 109, 115). They both gave detailed de-
sc1·iptions of the robber, his appearance, size, and clothing 
(T. 91, 112-113). Considering their testimony and all the 
facts and circumstances, it is clear that both ·witnesses 
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would have recognized and identified Gilpin in court, even 
if they had not preV1iously seen him at Dee's Hamburger 
Drive-In and in Judge Elton's courtroom. This is true, 
especially in light of the fact that Mis.s Hom did not even 
make an identifrication in Judge E1ton's courtroom (T. 116). 
Further, the record establishes that both witnesses had 
excellent opportunities for sustained observation of appel-
lant at the time of the crime. The appellant, as stated be-
fore, did not wear a mask or disguise or otherwise attempt 
to conceal his identity from the victims. He was in the res-
taurant for at least an half-an-hour before the robbery (T. 
94). They both waitched him go to the cash register and 
take the money (T. 102, 114). In Williams v. United States, 
409 F. 2d 471 (D. C. Cir. 1969), the court ruled that even: 
" ... if we assume a defect (in the police sta-
tion confrontation), we do not think a remand is 
necessary here because the record before us provides 
an independent source for the two 1in-court identi-
fications of such a nature as to dispel any substan-
tial likelihood of misidentification." Id. wt 473. 
The record in Williams, like in this case, showed that the: 
". . . two witnesses had excellent, not to say 
unique in the one instance, opportunities for sus-
tained observation at the time of the crime, and 
each made firm and positive identifications of ap-
pellant at trial." Id. 
This same test was applied in Wade, 388 U. S. at 242. Re-
spondent submits that even if a defect is !assumed, the in· 
court idenitifrioations did have independent sources and ap· 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO PRE-
SENT EVIDENCE RELATING TO APPEL-
LANT'S PRESENCE IN MIDVALE AFTER 
THE ROBB:filRY; SUCH REFUSAL DID NOT 
DENY APPELLANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT HIS ALIBI. 
The appeNant in making this argument is p:roc€eding 
under a fal.ge premise, to wit: that the Midvale incident 
"would have tied together the testimony of the witnesses 
for the defendant and corroborated his alibi." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 16.) The conclusion drawn from tbhis premise is 
equally faulty : "not on'1y could such evidence aid to esta!b-
lish his whereabouts but would also render his becoming 
involved in a fiight likely improbable if he had just com-
mitted a robbery." (Appellant's Brief, p. 18.) Thi8 con-
clusion is drawn without any supporting evidence, and 
when viewed in light of the fact that the robbery occurred 
in downtown Salt Lake between 9 :00 and 9 :30 p.m. (T. 
90, 91) and the fight took place at about 11 :00 p.m. in 
Midvale, (T. 160, 168), it could be very probable that the 
appellant was involved in both. 
The can hardly claim prejudice and reversi-
ble error when the record clearly shows that the fight in 
Midvale did get before the jury. The defense counsel stated 
that he wanted the ev,idence ,to show "that the event of a 
fight did place and substantiate that Mr. Gilpin 
was present," (T. 154, 15'5), and "merely, for the point of 
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showing to the j m·y he1·e was an event tha:t was not fabri-
cated by any per-son and which was a legitimate point of 
reference" (T. 155). The Judge then said: 
THE COURT: So far as the point referred t,1 
is concerned, that fa already in. Wha:t Ledford sai(i 
[investigation showed that Gilpin \>'as involved in a 
fight in Midvale] would permit you to argt;e about 
it. Now, if it is a matter of prejudice, and I let you 
go into it, I don't know where it is going to end. I 
don't know how far the State, then, will want to go 
on cross-examination to show that he was one of 
the participants in a brawl, or an incipient riot_ 
I don't know where it was; that he was one of the 
rtoters - one of the brawlers; I don't knov\' ho1Y 
far they are going to go, and I don't know - if you 
go into it, I can't -s.top it for cross examination. 
MR. BARNEY: [agreeing j I would think, your 
Honor, that the less sa:id about that, be the less 
prejudicial to the defendant. 
THE COURT: That was one thing I was cau-
tious about. If you don't think it is going to hurt 
your defendant, I think I ·will let you go ahead. 
MR. BARNEY: Well, the mere - the ow 
thing that we desire to do, ma:inly, ·was to sh(n-,· fa1c 
this - that such event in Midvale on this evening 
did, in fact, take place; and the matte1· is 8 matter 
of 1·ecord" (T. 155). (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Thedrick, the prosecuting attorney, then responded by 
saying that no details should be admitted in evidence (T. 
156). The Com't again agreed (T. 156) and Mr. Barney 
said: 
MR. BARNEY: No; we don't want to try the 
merits of the brawl; want to establish, merely, that 
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there is a problem there, existing; substantial evi-
dence to show tJhat the defendant in fact did appear 
'in Mi,dvale. 
THE COURT: All rig•ht; you have had, at 
lea;st - you have had, at least, three persons testify 
to that haven't you? 
MR. BARNEY : That is correct. 
THE COURT: Ledford Baid he was there. 
MR. BARNEY: Mr. Ledford said - yes (T. 
156) . (Emphasis added.) 
Martin Joseph Martinez testifiied thrut a fight took 
place (T. 152). Dennis Montoya also testified that a fight 
took place (T. 147). Mr. Fredrick objected to any further 
testimony on tJhe fight, and the objection was sustained 
(T. 147). This is the very thing the defense counsel agreed 
to in Chambers, Le.; no details ahout the fight (T. 154, 
155). 
In Vaughn v. State, 19 N. E. 2d 239 (Ind. 1939), the 
court ruled that the Bole test in determining whether evi-
dence is admissible to prove or disprove aliibi is whether 
the evidence of.f ered tends to prove facts sought to be es-
tab1ished. Id. at 242. The evidence in tJhis case, i.e., details 
about the fight, would not tend to prove the alibi defenBe. 
In Wisdom v. People, 11 Colo. 170, 17 Pac. 519 ( 1887), the 
court admitted testimony that on the evening of the crime 
the defendant was at a pawnbroker's office. They refuBed, 
however, to allow testimony that he borrowed money at 
that time, because such evidence was immaterial. 'I'he 
same rationale controls the present fact situa:tion. Appel-
lant should not be able to testify that he was involved in a 
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fight even though testimony that he was m Midvale is 
properly admissible. 
The appellant claims that the error occurred when he 
took the stand to testify. He was asked why he went to 
Midvale ( T. 166) . The district a:ttorney objected to the 
question as being immaterial, and the Court sustained the 
objection (T. 166). In order to answer the question "And 
why were you going to Midvale?" (T. 166) (Emphasis 
added), the defendant would have had to go into the de-
tails about the fight; the very thing defense said 
he did not want to do. There was no evidence presented 
to indicate that defendant went to Midvale for the specific 
purpose of He could have gone for other reasons 
and ended up in a brawl. The objecmon was properly sus-
tained to the form of 1Jhe question asked and tJhe 'resulting 
details which could not have been avoided by answering the 
question the way it was asked. Defense counsel made no 
effort to re-phrase the question. 
Further, the district attorney asked the defendant if 
the boys who had previously testified were with him after 
10 :30 on the night of the robbery. 'Dhe defendant answered 
yes (T. 170). The boys' testimony concerning the f,ight was 
already in (T. 147-1'52). The fact that the appellant went 
to Midvale was in evidence (T. 166). And the fact that 
defendant went with the boys was in evidence (T. 170). 
The jury could make the connections, and appeNant cannot 
claim prejudicial error in light of these facts, especially 
since defense counsel agreed that no details be admitted. 
'Dhe very points he wanted before the jury were in evidence. 
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Respondent .submits that this eX!amination of the record 
shows clearly that no error was committed and appellant 
suffered no prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent asks this Court to affirm the decision by 
the trial court and hold that the court committed no error 
in denying appeUant's motion to suppress the in-court 
identifications and in refusing to allow detailed evidence of 
an event which occurred at least one and a half hours after 
the robbery. 
Resl)'ectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
